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Abstract 
The “efficient institutions view” on property rights claims that property rights emerged and are enforced 
when their enforcement maximizes net wealth. In a cross-country pattern this is usually understood as the 
prediction that economic development creates the incentives to provide higher quality property rights, but 
this claim is highly debated. This paper tries to take various property rights scholars’ arguments seriously 
and see property rights quality as a two dimensional concept, the two dimensions being the definition and 
the assignment of property rights. The paper derives a measure for these two dimensions of property 
rights and shows that it is the assignment dimension which is determined by development, while the 
definition dimensions is rather determined by cultural factors, especially those deeper factors that seem to 
reflect a long-run effect of Western European culture. According to the paper, the main reasons behind 
this may be the difference in the expropriability of income generated by an improvement of each 
dimension, and the way such improvements may or may not affect countries’ catching up process. 
JEL: P14, P16, O11 
Keywords: property rights, efficient institutions, economic development, culture 
1. Introduction 
Once it is accepted that property rights security is the most important determinant 
of economic development, it is obvious we need to immediately raise the question, what 
are the most important determinants of property rights security? In this paper I will 
focus on one of the explanations which have been developed to answer that question, 
the so-called economic approach to property rights, or the efficient institutions view. 
The efficient institutions hypothesis is understood as the claim that economic 
development will create incentives for governments to provide a higher security of 
property rights. The empirical tests of this hypothesis are usually cross-country 
regressions with property rights security on the left-hand side and a measure of 
economic development on the right-hand side.  
The paper argues that, on the one hand, property rights quality is a two-
dimensional concept, because property rights should be considered as the result of two 
constitutional decisions: one is concerned with the definition of property rights while 
the other is concerned with the assignment of property rights. Definition and 
assignment will be considered as two dimensions of property rights quality. On the 
other hand, property rights in the “economic” approach must be understood in a 
broader sense than it usually is by the empirical papers. It must also include those rights 
that are considered to be in the political sphere of human actions as opposed to the 
economic. 
The “economic approach”, when carefully applied, does not imply that the one 
single determinant of property rights is economic development. As this view suggests 
that institutions are created to minimize transaction costs, culture as an important 
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determinant of transaction costs should be considered, too. The two dimensions of 
property rights, however, might not equally well be determined by development and 
culture. We can expect that development has a greater effect on the assignment 
dimension while culture has a greater effect on the definition dimension. First, even if 
the assignment dimension is improved by economic development, the definition 
dimension can only be improved if economic development is based on innovation. 
When imitation is the main driving force, the government will not have an incentive to 
widen the definition of property rights beyond the level of what is needed for the 
markets for goods in order to reach the level which would be needed for a market for 
ideas. Second, the less the definition of property rights is in line with cultural 
understanding, the more costly it will be to enforce them.  
To test these claims empirically one needs a measure of the two dimensions of 
property rights. To follow the bundle of rights definition of property rights we need a 
broader measure than that used in the literature. I use measures of economic and civil 
freedom in order to derive measures for the two dimensions of property rights. The 
cross country regressions which are run with the measures of the two dimensions of 
property rights as dependent variables show that, controlled for cultural determinants, 
economic development proxied by GDP per capita and education have a much stronger 
effect on the assignment dimension than on the definition dimension, while the cultural 
variables affect the definition dimension more. Generally, the definition dimension is 
less “efficient” and better explained by deeper cultural factors. 
2.  The efficient institutions view on property rights 
The ancient political economy problem of having a government that enforces but 
does not violate property rights was reformulated as a key dilemma for comparative 
economics by Djankov et al. (2003). They develop a framework in which society faces a 
trade-off between the cost of private and public expropriation, and is supposed to 
choose the institutional mix with the lowest social cost given the institutional possibility 
frontier set by “civic capital”. This framework reflects the “constrained efficient” view 
of institutions, which is the proposition that “the distribution of property rights is 
chosen in order to maximize wealth net of transaction costs.” (Allen 2012, p. 399)1  
This general claim implies, first, that “[t]he pressure to change property rights 
emerges only as a resource becomes increasingly scarce relative to society’s wants” 
(North and Thomas 1973, p. 19). That is, as explained by Demsetz (1967) in his classic 
paper, an increase in demand will create an incentive to solve externality problems 
intensified by a higher demand, that is, to define and enforce private property rights, 
and create a market of the good which has become sufficiently scarce. Developing this 
line of reasoning further, Demsetz (2002) argues that the main driving force is 
specialization, which reduces the personal character of exchange relations 
(“compactness”) within the community, improves technology, and increases the 
complexity of social organizations. These processes are the deeper roots of the 
motivation to create private property.  
Second, the constrained efficient view of property rights implies that if transaction 
costs change, the distribution of property rights will probably change as well. This is, 
indeed, the argument that Allen (2012) makes to explain the emergence of different 
                                                 
1 See also the interesting debate in the blogosphere between Leeson (2013a,b) and Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2013a,b).  
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institutions in pre-modern Britain. The most important element of transaction costs is 
the cost incurred to “make and enforce a claim” (Holcombe 2014, p. 476) or the “costs 
of policing the institutions” (Barzel 1989, p.84), that is, the costs of enforcing property 
rights. When transaction costs become low enough, defining and enforcing property 
rights becomes profitable.  
The idea that higher demand and lower transaction costs of exchange will create 
incentives for defining and enforcing property rights implies that economic 
development creates incentives to increase the quality of property rights protection.2 
That is why in empirical and cross-country quantitative analyses of the determinants of 
property rights this hypothesis is usually formalized as a test of whether per capita 
income is a statistically significant independent variable in a regression in which 
property rights quality is the dependent one. A higher income means a higher demand 
and a better technology for enforcement. Discussing the reasons why development 
leads to an institutional system characterized by more democracy and less corruption, 
Paldam and Gundlach (2008, p. 68) emphasize, for example, that with development 
“demand for capital and skills rises” and the “increasing opportunity cost of time 
provides incentives for transactions to become more effective”, which finally “forces 
administrations to become transparent and incorrupt”. 
The efficient institutions view of property rights can be contrasted with others. La 
Porta et al. (1999) provide a test, a very similar to which is conducted by Mijiyawa 
(2013) with a larger database. The evidence of La Porta et al. (1999) supports the 
efficient institutions view and so does that of Mijiyawa (2013), although his main 
conclusion is that what he calls the political approach (tested as the effects of 
democracy, income inequality, and the abundance of natural resources) is the most 
relevant and robust in explaining property rights when it is contrasted with three other 
approaches; the cultural (tested as the effect of the share of Protestants within the 
population), the historical (tested as the effect of common law legal origin), and the 
economic (tested as the effect of GDP per capita). He finds that in the sub-sample of 
rich countries, as well as in the sub-sample of African countries GDP is not a relevant 
explanatory variable (ibid., pp. 154, 176), while in the sub-sample of poor countries the 
relevance of the cultural approach, that is, the significance of the share of Protestants, is 
lost (ibid., pp. 154, 177).  
Other cultural variables, however, are usually found to affect property rights 
significantly. Norton (2004) evaluates whether dimensions of culture in the data of 
Hofstede et al. (2010) affect property rights security and the rule of law. He concludes 
that they do, but not all of them. The most important dimension is that of 
“individualism” which “reflects people’s identity as individuals or as members of 
groups” (ibid., p. 91). He finds that cultural dimensions together can explain roughly 
half of the cross-country variation in property rights and rule of law data.  
There is an extensive literature focusing on the role of culture in determining the 
cross-country differences of institutions. In these papers, however, the dependent 
variable is not property rights but a more general measure of institutions (Klasing 2013, 
                                                 
2 The question that can be raised immediately, as was done by the anonymous referee of this paper, is 
what is it that causes economic development, then? This paper focuses only on the determinants of 
property rights, not on the determinants of economic development, but it is worth noting that both the 
claim that higher quality property rights lead to development and the claim that development leads to 
higher quality property rights can be right at the same time. That would imply a virtuous circle of 
property rights security and development. A model of this kind is developed by Gradstein (2004). 
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Licht et al. 2007). This does not make them irrelevant from the point of view of this 
paper because property rights security accounts for a significant part of the quality of 
institutions, and there is a strong correlation between different factors of institutional 
quality (Langbein and Knack 2010, Kunčič 2014). Those papers therefore that conclude 
that culture has an explanatory power over institutions (e.g., Tabellini 2008, 2010, Licht 
et al. 2007, Maseland 2013, Williamson and Mathers 2011a,b) give some support to the 
claim that property rights are determined by culture to some extent.  
The main factors and theories that have been developed in the past decades to 
explain cross-country differences in property rights quality are well summarized by the 
three papers of Levine (2005), Hansson (2009), and Mijiyawa (2013)3. The aim of these 
three papers is the same: to evaluate different explanations of property rights quality or 
security. There is of course a substantial overlap between the theories they test and the 
explanatory variables they use, and the conclusion they draw: it is difficult to drop any 
one of the different explanations. Interestingly, it is only Mijiyawa (2013) of these three 
who considers the “economic approach”; cultural factors and determinants of 
colonization receive much more attention. As I will try to show, this approach may 
deserve much careful scrutiny.  
In the rest of this paper I will address two shortcomings of the literature reviewed 
above. First, this literature is exclusively concerned with the determinants of how rights 
are assigned. As we will see, besides the question of who owns what, property rights 
institutions must answer another question, the question of what it means to own 
something. The quality of property rights institutions are determined by both decisions. 
A cross-country test of the determinants of property rights should therefore check the 
determinants of both of these constitutional dimensions of property rights.  
Second, the claim that culture has an effect on property rights security is usually 
seen as an alternative to the “constrained efficiency” view. Culture, however, is a crucial 
determinant of transaction costs and is thus a determinant of the efficient assignment of 
property rights. That is, a discussion of the efficient institutions approach to property 
rights should include the role of culture. 
3. Two dimensions of property rights 
3.1. Assignment and definition as two dimensions of property rights 
Property rights are defined here in the traditions of the property rights school 
(Alchian (1977[1965], Barzel 1989, Holcombe 2014)4 as “socially recognized rights of 
action” (Alchian and Demsetz 1973, p. 17), or a bundle of “rights to use resources, 
including one's body and mind” (ibid.). The literature concerned with the factors that 
determine property rights security in a cross-country setting seems to neglect two 
conclusions stemming from this definition.  
The first neglected aspect is the difference between the social recognition of 
what any owner can do with what she owns and the social recognition of who the 
                                                 
3 A more detailed examination of the factors they use will follow in section 4. 
4 For a more detailed understanding of the “property rights approach” than what follows, see Alchian 
(1977[1965]), Alchian and Demsetz (1973), or Barzel (1989). Colombatto (2004) provides more recent 
original contributions to, and an overview of, property rights economics. See Holcombe (2014) for a 
recent theoretical contribution to this literature.  
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owner of a certain asset is. This is implicit in the definitions used in the literature but is 
neglected. For example, Levine (2005, p. 62, italics added) defines the term “property 
rights” as the “degree to which a broad set of policies, legal and political systems, and 
informal norms define and protect private property”. Similarly, Norton (2004, p. 88, italics 
added) refers to the same set of institutions as those which “specify and enforce property 
rights.” These two different aspects of property rights are made explicit by Vanberg 
(2001), who explains that there are “two constitutional decisions” to be made about 
property rights. One is the definition of property rights, which answers the question 
“what does it mean to own something?”, while the other is the assignment of property 
rights, which answers the question “who owns what?” The empirical literature does not 
make this difference, and, consequently, the possibility does not arise that these two 
decisions regarding property rights are not affected in the same way by the factors under 
scrutiny.5  
The claim that the system of property rights is determined by two separate 
constitutional decisions means that property rights security has two orthogonal 
dimensions. This is because property rights can be expropriated in two ways: either by 
redefining property rights or reassigning property rights without the consent of the 
owner. Property rights security is then not to be measured with a one-dimension scale 
but with two different scales or dimensions, which I will call the definition dimension 
and the assignment dimension. The definition dimension describes what the bundle of 
rights that is given to the owner of a resource includes, while the assignment dimension 
describes the certainty that the owner will not be deprived of her resource.  
The second neglected aspect of property rights is that the resource the property 
rights of which can be defined and assigned may mean “one's body and mind” (Alchian 
and Demsetz 1973, p. 17). As Furubotn and Richter (2005, p. 95) say, “[t]o economists, 
every right can be interpreted as property right”. This means that the definition 
dimension of property rights should be understood more broadly than it usually is. The 
fact that some property rights are “property in one’s own person” (Furubotn and 
Richter 2005, p. 91) does not make them fundamentally different from those rights 
which are defined over resources that can be sold or expropriated. This approach to 
property rights implies that freedom and property rights are just two sides of the same 
coin, which is clearly reflected in Allen’s (2007, p. 312) definition of an “economic 
property right” as “one’s ability to freely exercise a choice”. As we have just seen, there 
is nothing in this “economic” approach to property rights that excludes civil liberties, or 
human rights more generally speaking, such as free speech6.  
                                                 
5 Hodgson (2015) criticizes the economic approach towards property rights for not realizing the 
importance of property as a legal concept. Although Allen (2015) claims that Hodgson (2015) simply 
renames legal and economic rights for property right and possession, Hodgson (2015) does more than 
that. He argues convincingly that “freedom to exercise a choice” is not the same when it is the result of 
only (a lack of) enforcement (possession), as when this freedom is a legitimated by the community 
(property). This distinction is rather between how and whether the property rights are defined and how 
and whether they are enforced (assigned). Thus, Hodgson’s argument seems to support the claim that 
property rights security is not one-dimensional, but possibly two: whether a right is accepted by the 
community (definition) and whether it is enforced (assignment) are two different aspects.  
6 Barzel (1989, p. 2., footnote 1) makes it explicit: “[h]uman rights are simply part of people’s property 
rights. Human rights may be difficult to protect or to exchange, but so are rights to many other assets.” 
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Empirical studies usually make a difference between economic and civil freedoms 
as separate elements of individual liberty7. Although these two kinds of freedom are not 
identical with the two dimensions of property rights, the definition dimension of 
property rights arguably has a larger role in determining civil freedom than it does in 
determining economic freedom. The reason lies in the nature of the resource over 
which property rights are defined. As the human body and mind are not expropriable, 
the more important question about them is not who the owner of these resources is but 
what the owner is allowed to do with them. What makes civil freedom different from 
economic freedom is that the activities that are associated with civil freedom use these 
non-expropriable resources more intensively. Consequently, a change in the definition 
of property rights, which changes the bundle of rights of actions the owner of a 
resource is allowed to make, will have a greater effect on civil freedom than on 
economic freedom. Similarly, a change in the assignment of property rights, which 
makes the assignment of property rights over expropriable resources more or less 
uncertain, has a greater effect on economic freedom than on civil freedom. We can 
expect, then, that differences in the definition of property rights are reflected better in 
civil freedoms, and differences in the assignment of property rights are reflected better 
in economic freedoms. 
In sum, if we follow the economic approach to property rights we should apply 
the economic definition of property rights, which leads to the conclusion that individual 
freedom can be restricted in two ways: either by narrowing down the bundle of rights of 
the owners, a decision on the definition of property rights, or by changing the 
ownership of the resource without the owner’s consent, a decision on the assignment of 
property rights. All “kinds” of individual freedom, such as civil and economic freedom, 
can be seen as the freedom to exercise different actions made possible by these two 
constitutional decisions. Since different human actions are produced with technologies 
that are more or less intensive in expropriable and non-expropriable resources, they are 
not affected by the two constitutional dimensions to an equal degree.  
3.2. Development and the two dimensions of property rights 
We can expect that economic development is more important in determining the 
assignment dimension of property rights than the definition dimension of property 
rights, while the case with culture is just the reverse. The reasons are concerned, on the 
one hand, with the expropriability of the benefits which a better definition or 
assignment of property rights leads to, while on the other hand they are concerned with 
the effect of culture on transaction costs. 
An improvement in the assignment of rights means that the return on productive 
activities becomes higher as compared to rent seeking (Murphy et al. 1993). With a 
weaker enforcement, then, more resources will be devoted to socially wasteful rent 
seeking. A more secure assignment will increase the value of an expropriable resource 
that can be sold, which creates incentives for a third person to provide a more secure 
assignment for a return. Widening the definition of property rights, however, as we saw, 
will lead to a disproportionally large increase in the freedom of those activities which 
                                                 
7 Political liberties are usually considered a third freedom besides the above-mentioned two. Since political 
liberties are usually concerned with public decisions, not with individual ones, I ignore them. When it 
comes to the quantitative measures of civil and political liberties, the differences between them are 
small. 
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will yield inexpropriable benefit. The rents created by civil liberties (first and second 
generation human rights) as BenYishay and Betancourt (2014) argue are much more 
difficult to expropriate because they are “dispersed in space, time and individuals to 
whom they accrue than the ones generated through political rights” (ibid., p. 556). As a 
result, although it would be efficient to change the definition dimension of property 
rights, it may not pay off for a third person to do so because the rent generated as a 
result cannot be expropriated. The incentive to improve the assignment of property 
rights in the hope of a higher return is stronger than the incentives to widen the 
definition of property rights. 
The second reason to think that the definition dimension is less related to 
economic development than the assignment dimension is the relation between 
innovation and the civil freedoms. A broader definition of rights that makes it possible 
to exercise actions of the civil freedom “bundle” creates a market for ideas – a market 
for activities such as “speech, writing, and the exercise of religious beliefs (Coase 1974, 
p. 384)”. Coase and Wang (2013, p. 190) apply this idea when arguing that the lack of a 
free market for ideas prevents technological and social innovation from becoming a 
major force behind economic development, which may slow down economic growth 
when the steam provided by the potential of catching-up runs out. It is because “[t]he 
lack of a market for ideas is directly responsible for the lack of innovation” (ibid., p. 
193), and further because the market for ideas “determines what kind of consumers (as 
well as entrepreneurs, politicians, and lawyers) we find in the economy, their characters 
and value, and thus ultimately decides what the market for goods is and how effectively 
it works” (ibid., p. 194). 
This means that the relation between economic development and the definition of 
property rights depends on whether the country’s economic development is the result of 
“producing ideas” or “using ideas” (Romer 1993). The more important the first strategy 
is, the more important is the role of the market for ideas, and this makes the definition 
dimension more strongly connected to economic development. Since it is developed 
countries whose economic growth is based on the “producing idea” strategy while those 
lagging behind are “using ideas” rather than producing them, the prospect of 
development does not create an incentive to introduce a broader definition of property 
rights until the “using ideas” strategy is working. 
3.3. Culture and the two dimensions of property rights 
Culture is a part of the process of the defining and assigning of property rights 
because they affect the transaction costs. First, the cost of enforcing property rights can 
be reduced by culture, because “[m]oral and cultural constraints that encourage people 
to honor contracts and property rights ... discourage opportunistic behavior” (Anderson 
and Hill 2004, p. 15). Consequently, the lesser the extent to which the informal rules are 
in line with the formal rules, the more costly enforcement will be. That is, if the 
informal assignment of property rights is not the same as the formal assignment, 
enforcement costs will be higher. 
Ethics is thus a factor in enforcement and therefore a determinant of the 
enforcement of property rights. But ethics has a more crucial role for property rights 
than determining the technology of enforcement; ethics and culture determine what is 
to be enforced in the first place. Basing his thoughts on experimental research, Wilson 
(2015) explains the emergence of property rights as a moral convention. The 
experimental results he presents give support to the claim that the notion of property is 
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based on morals concerning what is right, which is, roughly speaking, inarticulate 
knowledge of the abstract rules, not the concrete ones. That is, property in the abstract 
is a moral concept: informal rules including culture provide the background for the 
emergence of property rights, and not only for the enforcement of property rights once 
they have emerged. This is line with the critique that McCloskey (2015) formulates on 
new institutional economics, and that Hodgson (2015) formulates on the economic 
approach of property rights. One line of criticism is common: institutions (property 
rights) are not only constraints; they do not only provide incentives. Institutions and 
property rights have meaning and interpretations; that is to say they have an ethical 
foundation.  
Deciding to accept a definition of rights in the abstract seems to be different from 
the decision to follow or not to follow the rules defined. Precisely because human 
motivation is not one-dimensional, the two dimensions of property rights will have a 
more or less ethical foundation. If the definition of property rights is a decision about 
‘what is right’, it is the assignment of property rights that will rather be affected by 
efficiency consideration because the decision to respect property rights results from a 
trade-off between the moral and the economic value of (non)compliance.  
4. Determinants of the two dimensions of property rights  
The empirical test of the theoretical considerations seems to be clear: we should 
first have a measure of the definition and the assignment dimension of property rights, 
and see in a cross-country setting whether they are differently affected by culture and 
development. The theory thus suggests an empirical test that can be summarized by two 
general regression equations as follows: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) iiiii εcontrolsβcultureβ.dev.ecββdefinition ++++= 3210 ,    (1) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) iiiii ηcontrolsγcultureγ.dev .ecγγassignment ++++= 3210 ,    (2) 
where definition and assignment are the two dimensions of property rights, and ec. 
dev. and culture are certain measures of economic development and culture. The 
regressions include some other variables, too, which are called controls; ε and η are the 
error terms, and i denotes a country. 
The implication of my argument can be summarized as the hypothesis that 
1β < 1γ  and 2β > 2γ . How this can be tested with the available cross-country data will be 
examined in the remaining sections. 
4.1. Measuring the two dimensions of property rights 
To create quantitative measures of the two dimensions of property rights I will 
use two indexes of freedom that are widely used in the literature (Bologna and Hall 
2014, Paldam 2007): the Economic Freedom of the World Index of the Fraser Institute 
(Gwartney et al., 2013), and the index of Civil Liberties of Freedom House (Freedom 
House 2014a). The reason for choosing these two only, and not using the index of 
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Political Rights, too, which is also a part of Freedom House’s Freedom in the World 
Report, is that the approach presented above deals only with the property rights of 
individuals, not with the way public decisions are made, which is what the index of 
Political Rights is about. 
To put it simply, I suppose that these two types of freedom - civil and economic - 
describe both the definition and the assignment of property rights but these two 
dimensions are not identical with the categories of economic and civil freedom. That is 
why I will use the sub-scores of these two indexes8 (see Table 1) in a factor analysis to 
arrive at a measure for each of the two dimensions. As even the names of these 
categories show, there is a substantial overlap between what these two indexes measure. 
This supports my argument: both indexes reflect a combination of the definition and 
assignment dimension of property rights9, and the aim is to extract these two 
dimensions. 
To do this a factor analysis is conducted with the “sub-categories” of civil liberties 
and the “areas” of economic freedom. This means that we have nine sub-scores of 
freedom on which each country is evaluated. Running the factor analysis on these nine 
components and picking the first two factors will hopefully give us quantitative 
measures for the two dimensions of property rights.  
                                                 
8 In the case of the Civil Liberties index there are four sub-scores called “sub-categories”, such as 
Freedom of Expression and Belief, Associational and Organizational Rights, Rule of Law, and Personal 
Autonomy and Individual Rights (see Freedom House, 2014a). In the case of the Economic Freedom of 
the World Index there are five areas which include Size of Government, Legal Structure and Property 
Rights, Sound Money, Freedom to Trade Internationally, and Regulation (see Gwartney et al., 2013, p. 
4). 
9 This overlap is clearly shown by the fact that one of the subcomponents of civil liberties, the rule of law, 
is very close, even in name, to one of the areas of economic freedom, legal structure and property rights. 
This reinforces my argument: these indexes include the same elements which we have to disentangle 
and re-group in order to have a meaningfully two-dimensional description of institutions. I thank an 
anonymous referee for bringing this into my attention. 
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Table 1. Rotated Factor Matrix of the Factor Analysis 
 Factor 
 
Civil Liberties sub-component/ 
Economic Freedom areas 1 2 
Freedom of Expression and Belief 0.819 0.367 
Associational and Organizational Rights 0.893 0.299 
Rule of Law 0.879 0.413 
civil rights 
subcategories 
Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights 0.817 0.472 
Size of Government -0.291 -0.035 
Legal Structure and Property Rights 0.407 0.615 
Sound Money 0.330 0.675 
Freedom to trade internationally 0.152 0.864 
economic 
freedom areas 
Regulation 0.187 0.633 
Notes: The table shows the loadings for each sub-score, which describe how the two factors can “explain” the nine sub-scores. 
Note that in the case of the Economic Freedom of the World index a higher value always means more economic freedom. 
Consequently, a higher value for “Regulation” means less regulation, and a higher value for the “Size of Government” means 
a smaller government. The positive loadings on “regulation” thus means that a higher value of both factors imply a freer 
regulatory environment, although factor 2 is more important. The negative loadings for the size of government mean that a 
higher value of each factor implies a bigger government, although factor 1 is much more important. 
 
Running this factor analysis with the data of 122 countries for the year 201010 
shows that the two factors derived explain overall roughly 66 percent of the total 
variance, with 37 percent being explained by the first and the remaining 29 by the 
second (see Table 7 in the Appendix). The question is, which factor can be called the 
definition and which one the assignment of property rights. These two factors are 
described in Table 1 by the rotated factor matrix giving the loadings for each sub-score. 
The general picture is that factor 1 loads more strongly on the sub-scores of civil 
freedom while factor 2 loads more strongly on the sub-scores of economic freedom. 
The argument in section 3.1 can be applied to answer the question: the activities 
associated with economic freedom use expropriable resources more intensively, 
therefore economic freedom, which is mostly about the freedom to exercise a choice 
over expropriable resources, will be determined by the assignment dimension to a 
greater extent. Indeed, the definition of economic freedom (Gwartney and Lawson 
2003, p. 406)11 suggests that it is concerned with the enforcement of some predefined 
rights, while civil liberties are defined by naming the rights to be enforced12. Therefore, I 
will call factor 1 the definition of property rights and factor 2 the assignment of 
property rights.  
As a result of this analysis, we have a cross-country dataset with each country 
having a score on the definition of property rights (factor 1) and a score on the 
assignment of property rights (factor 2). These data are illustrated by the scatterplot in 
Figure 1. 
                                                 
10 See Table 5 in the Appendix for summary statistics of the nine sub-scores. 
11 “Institutions and policies are consistent with economic freedom when they provide an infrastructure 
for voluntary exchange, and protect individuals and their property from aggressors seeking to use 
violence, coercion, and fraud to seize things that do not belong to them” (Gwartney and Lawson 2003, 
p. 406).  
12 The index of the Freedom House is based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of the United 
Nations (Freedom House 2014b, United Nations 1948), which defines the bundle of rights every person 
should be able to exercise. 
Pál Czeglédi, Are both dimensions of property rights “efficient”? 
 
Available online at http://eaces.liuc.it 
51 
 
Figure 1. Enforcement and scope of rights in 122 countries in 2010 
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Notes: The Figure shows the cross-country pattern of the two factors, the factor matrix of which is shown in Table 1. Both 
factor scores are standardized. 
 
The scatterplot describes a y-shaped pattern. Although there is a positive 
relationship between these dimensions for a large number of countries, a substantial 
number of countries have a relatively high level of property rights enforcement while 
they have a very narrow scope of rights, even narrower than that of many countries in 
which the enforcement of property rights is much weaker. That is why when looking at 
all the countries, there is no correlation between the two dimensions. The next section 
will examine how the determinants of these two dimensions differ. 
4.2. Cross-country regressions on the dimensions of property rights 
Having quantitative measures of the two dimensions of property rights makes it 
possible to run regressions of the kinds of equations (1) and (2) in order to see in a 
cross-country setting whether development and culture affect these dimensions in 
different ways. The dependent variables of these cross-country regressions are thus 
those measures of the dimensions of property rights just derived and plotted in Figure 
1.  
The independent variables are those usually found as determinants of property 
rights in the literature. The choice of independent variables is thus based on empirical 
papers aimed at testing different theories of property rights. Levine (2005), Mijiyawa 
(2013), and Hansson (2009) review and test roughly the same theories, allowing me to 
decide what the most important independent variables are. Based on these three papers 
and some others I cited in section 2, I will use three groups of independent variables: 
development variables, culture variables, and controls. 
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The development variables include GDP per capita in 1970 and primary 
education. GDP is the obvious proxy of development. As a test variable of the 
“economic approach” Mijiyawa (2013) applies this, too. Following him I will use the log 
value of GDP of 1970 to minimize the effect from reverse causality. GDP is the 
CGDPE variable of Feenstra et al. (2013). CGDPE is chosen since in this case we only 
use the data from one year, and this type of comparison is the one this measure of GDP 
is suggested for by Feenstra et al. (2013). As an alternative measure of development I 
use the 1970 value of years of primary schooling from Barro and Lee (2013). The use of 
an education variable as a proxy of development is suggested by those papers (e.g. 
Paldam and Gundlach 2008) that emphasize that it is the demands of a more educated 
electorate which will create incentives for the government to “modernize”.  
To proxy culture I use three different groups of cultural variables including only 
one of them in separate regressions. The first group includes religious adherence data 
from Barro (2003). I use only those that any one of three review papers (Levine 2005, 
Mijiyawa 2013, Hansson 2009) found significant. That is why I only include the fraction 
of Catholics, Protestant, Muslims, and Other religions13.  
The second group of cultural variables includes data on culture from Hofstede 
et al. (2010, 2012). Hofstede’s four dimensions include the following. Power distance is 
“the extent to which the less powerful members of institutions and organizations within 
a country expect and accept that power is distributed unequally” (Hofstede et al. 2010, 
p. 61, italics deleted). Uncertainty avoidance indicates “the extent to which the members of 
a culture feel threatened by ambiguous or unknown situations” (ibid., p. 191, italics 
deleted). Individualism, according to Hofstede et al. (2010, p. 92, italics deleted), “pertains 
to societies in which the ties between individuals are loose: everyone is expected to look 
after him- or herself and his or her immediate family.” Masculinity is about gender roles: 
“[a] society is called masculine when emotional gender roles are clearly distinct” (ibid., p. 
140, italics deleted). 
The third group of cultural variables is the data on Schwatz’s dimensions of 
culture as in Licht et al (2007). Schwartz (2008, pp. 8-10) differentiates between “three 
bipolar dimensions of culture”: autonomy (affective and intellectual) versus 
embeddedness, egalitarianism versus hierarchy, and mastery versus harmony. “In 
cultures with emphasis on embeddedness”, writes Schwartz (2008: 8-9), “people are 
viewed as entities in the collectivity. Meaning in life is expected to come largely through 
social relationships ... important values ... are social order, respect for tradition, security, 
and wisdom.” Hierarchy, on the other hand, “defines the unequal distribution of power, 
roles, and resources as legitimate and even desirable. ... Values of social power, 
authority, humility, and wealth are highly important” (ibid., p.9). Finally, harmony 
“emphasizes fitting into the social and natural world ... important values in harmony 
cultures include world at peace, unity with nature, and protecting the environment, and 
accepting one’s portion” (ibid., p.9). Cultural variables that are used as independent 
variables in the regressions come from a principal component analysis of these bipolar 
dimensions of culture. Autonomy-embeddeddness is the first principal component of 
intellectual autonomy, affective autonomy and the negative of embeddedness; 
egalitarianism-hierarchy is the first principal component of egalitarianism and the negative 
                                                 
13 This does not mean other than Catholic, Protestant, or Muslim, but other than all those Barro (2003) 
identifies. In addition to these four, Barro’s (2003) dataset includes adherence to six religions such as 
Other Christian, Orthodox, Jewish, Hindu, Buddhist, and Other Eastern Religions. 
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of hierarchy; mastery-harmony is the first principal component of mastery and the negative 
of harmony. 
Controls include other variables which the studies I cited usually find important. 
In the basic specification these include legal origin dummies form LaPorta et al. (2008), 
latitude (Gallup et al. 2001) and ethnic fractionalization (Alesina et al. 2003). These 
controls represent different non-exclusive theories of the evolution of property rights. 
Legal origins are proxies for the claim that English, French and other continental legal 
origins have had an impact on the evolution of the legal system, even in those countries 
where the legal system was transplanted from the outside, mainly by some colonial 
power. Latitude can be seen as a proxy variable to account for colonization strategy, 
because this strategy was to a great extent formulated by the conditions determined by 
climate (Levine 2005). The inclusion of ethnic fractionalization accounts for the idea 
that ethnic fractionalization makes the political system and institutions less “inclusive” 
and creates an incentive for policymakers to extract resources from other groups in the 
society, which leads to a worse property rights system. As Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) 
argue, a higher level fractionalization lowers the socially optimal level of public goods. 
All this means that I run regressions with the two dependent variables, with or 
without one of the development variables, and with one of the three groups of cultural 
variables. The controls are included in every regression. This gives eighteen regressions 
for the basic specification, the presentation of the exact results of which is left to the 
Appendix (Table 8-10), and a more transparent account of the results is presented as 
Table 2. The table shows those variables that were found statistically significant at the 
ten percent level at least. The plus or minus in a parenthesis shows how many times a 
certain variable was found to be significant and the sign of the effects found. Every row 
within a category represents three regressions: one without any development variable, 
one with education, and a third one with GDP per capita as a dependent variable. There 
are three rows in every category because the same regressions are run with each of the 
three groups of cultural variables as independent variables.  
The first three rows of Table 2 within the development category shows, for 
example, that with definition of property rights as the dependent variable it is only 
primary education that was found to be statistically significant at least at the 10 percent 
level, but only when the second group of cultural variables (that of Hofstede et al. 
(2010)) were used as independent variables. When it comes to assignment, education is 
found significant together with any one of the three cultural groups, while GDP per 
capita is not found significant together with Schwartz’s dimensions (Licht et al. 2007) of 
culture.  
Religious variables are much more important statistically in the case of definition 
as is shown in the “culture” section of Table 2. The other two groups of cultural 
variables are significant in both cases, although those dimensions that are usually found 
to be significant such as individualism (Norton 2004) or autonomy (Licht et al. 2007) 
affect significantly only the assignment dimensions. One important point to note is the 
strong effect of uncertainty avoidance on the definition dimension with a positive sign. 
This might be explained by the fact that some rights included in the Civil Liberties 
index, such as workers’ rights to engage in strikes or granting asylum for refugees, are 
rather “entitlements” than property rights as understood by the approach I take 
(Holcombe 2014, pp. 473-474), or require government intervention against private 
players such as in the case of gender equality in economic matters. These rights provide 
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a shield against different risks on the market. Uncertainty avoidance is relatively high in 
some Eastern and Southern European countries, for example. 
Within the controls latitude is more important in the case of definition than in the 
case of assignment, although it is not totally insignificant with the assignment 
dimension, either. The fact that it is only significant with one group of culture (religious) 
variables shows that culture may mean something similar to latitude, maybe because 
colonization is affected by geography and colonization indicates a strong cultural effect. 
This cultural effect, it seems, is more important in the case of the definition of rights 
than in the case of the assignment of rights. Ethnic fractionalizations has the “expected 
sign” only with assignment as the dependent variable; it has no effect on the definition 
dimension. Similarly, “non-English” legal origins has a negative sign as can be expected 
based on the literature.  
 
Table 2. Summary of the results: basic specifications 
 Dependent variable 
 definition of property rights assignment of property rights 
 
Primary education (+) 
Log GDP p. c. (+) 
Primary education (+) 
Primary education (+) 
Log GDP p. c. (+) 
Development 
 Primary education (+) 
Catholic (+,+,+) 
Other Religions (+,+,+) 
Other Religions (+) 
Power distance (-,-) 
Individualism (+,+,+) 
 
Uncertainty avoidance (+,+,+) 
Masculinity (-,-) 
Uncertainty avoidance (-,-) 
Culture 
Egalitarianism-hierarchy (+,+,+)  
French legal origin (-,-) 
Socialist legal origin (-) 
Latitude (+,+,+) 
French legal origin (-) 
Socialist legal origin (-,-) 
Latitude (+) 
 Ethnic fractionalization (-,-) Controls 
 
French legal origin (-,-) 
German legal origin (-) 
Ethnic fractionalization (-) 
Notes: The table shows a summary of the results of the eighteen regressions described in detail in Table 8-10. The variables 
in the table are those that were found significant at the ten percent significance level at least once out of these 18 regressions. 
One cell represents three regressions: one without the development variables, one with log GDP per capita, and one with 
education. All three include the same cultural and control variables. That is, the number of pluses or minuses can only be one 
for a development variable and can be three at the maximum for cultural and control variables. For a description of the 
variables see the text and the notes to Table 8-10 in the Appendix. 
 
In sum, these results seem to give support to the idea that development has a 
more important effect on the assignment dimension of property rights, while culture has 
a larger effect on the definition dimension. As is usual with regressions, the results are 
not crystal clear. Trying some alternative specifications may make them more “robust”. 
4.3. Robustness tests: alternative controls and “colonial” variables 
One approach to see whether this conclusion is robust is to try other controls – 
different proxies for roughly the same factors. Legal origin dummies that reflect a sort 
of European influence are replaced with different well-known proxies of European 
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influence: the fraction of the population speaking English and that speaking one of the 
major western European languages as a first language from Hall and Jones (1999). 
Latitude is not replaced with anything, but ethnic fractionalization is replaced with an 
alternative measure of fractionalization created by Fearon (2003).  
 
Table 3. Summary of the results: alternative controls 
 Dependent variable 
 definition of property rights assignment of property rights 
Primary education (+) 
Log GDP p.c. (+) 
Primary education (+) 
 Primary education (+) 
Development 
 Primary education (+) 
Muslim (-,-) 
Other Religions (+,+) 
 
Power distance (-) 
 
Uncertainty avoidance (+,+,+) 
Individualism (+) 
 
Masculinity (-,-,-) 
Culture 
Egalitarianism-hierarchy (+,+) 
Autonomy-embededdness (+) 
 
Mastery-harmony (-) 
English lang. frac.(-) 
European lang. frac. (+,+,+) 
Latitude (+,+,+) 
English lang. frac.(+) 
 
Latitude (+) 
European lang. frac. (+,+) 
Latitude (+,+) 
 
Controls 
Latitude (+,+,+) English lang. frac.(+,+) 
Notes: The table shows a summary of the results of the eighteen regressions described in detail in Table 11-13. The variables 
in the table are those that were found significant at the ten percent significance level at least once out of these 18 regressions. 
One cell represents three regressions: one without the development variables, one with log GDP per capita, and one with 
education. All three include the same cultural and control variables. That is, the number of pluses or minuses can only be one 
for a development variable and it can be three at the maximum for cultural and control variables. For a description of the 
variables see the text and the notes to Table 11-13 in the Appendix. 
 
The main difference is thus that these alternative European influence controls 
seem to be more of the cultural kind. English or French legal origins do not necessarily 
imply a higher share of the population speaking these languages, although in practice 
there is a correlation. But clearly the information they reflect is different: Malaysia and 
the US, for example both have English legal origins but they are clearly different 
culturally which is better reflected in the share of the population speaking English or 
European languages in general as a first language (0.89 as opposed to 0 and 0.97 as 
opposed to 0). 
Table 3 summarizes the results of the regression with these controls in a similar 
way as before. The difference in the effect of development is similar to what it was 
before: development variables are more important with the assignment variable as the 
dependent one. There is not much difference, however, in the strength of effect of the 
cultural variables with the exception of religious ones, which may be because of the fact 
that the new controls are much more “cultural” than they were in the previous 
regressions. It seems that the cultural controls are more important in the case of 
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definition than in the case of assignment. Uncertainty avoidance retains its effect on the 
definition of property rights. 
It is important to note that some controls such as latitude and European language 
fraction are much more significant with definition than with assignment, while English 
language fraction is more important and has a positive sign as a determinant of 
assignment (European language fraction held constant). On balance however, the 
European influence seems to be much more important for the definition dimension of 
property rights than for the assignment dimension. 
To sum up the results of the first robustness test, the two predictions of the 
paper, namely that culture is more important for definition and development is more 
important for assignment, cannot be rejected with these alternative controls, especially 
when it is recognized that the alternative controls reflect cultural effects, too. 
Although the results of the basic specification and the robustness tests have not 
rejected the basic ideas of this paper, they shed new light on them, because it seems it is 
especially “deep” elements of culture that are more important for definition than for 
assignment. To see this from a different angle I run another kind of robustness test 
here, which focuses only on those variables that are usually seen as proxies of the 
different ways colonization may have affected the development of property rights. What 
is important about these theories and proxies from the point of view of this paper is 
that with the help of these proxies it is possible to differentiate between a probable 
cultural effect of colonization and the effect that is derived only from the strategy of 
colonization and not from the identity of the colonizers. This may help check whether 
deeper cultural effects are really more important for the definition dimension than for 
the assignment dimension. 
Three relatively well-known variables are used as independent ones in these 
robustness tests. One is the settler mortality data from Acemoglu et al. (2001). 
According to their argument, settler mortality was crucial for colonizers in choosing the 
kind of colonization strategy they would follow. In areas where it was hard for 
Europeans to live because different diseases caused high mortality, the Europeans 
followed an extractive strategy, which lead to insecure property rights. In this argument, 
therefore, it is not the identity or culture of the colonizers that matter but the natural 
conditions they encountered.  
To proxy “European influence” I will use three variables. Two of them are the 
English fraction and European language fraction from Hall and Jones (1999) I used 
above. As an alternative to these two I will also use the “Euroshare” variable of Easterly 
and Levine (2014) which measures the share of the European population during the 
time of colonization. The reason for using these four particular variables is that we can 
see settler mortality as the one that accounts for the technology of enforcement, while 
the other three proxies can be seen as those that account for the European cultural 
effect. This interpretation is suggested by the construction of these variables and the 
results they inspired.  
Using these four variables as independent variables provides us with another way 
to separate the “deeper” cultural effect on the definition and on the assignment of 
property rights. Easterly and Levine (2014) themselves examine the relation between 
their Euroshare measure and the settler mortality variable of Acemoglu et al. (2001). 
Although their result that even small minorities of European populations matter 
positively for economic development seems to contradict that of Acemoglu et al. (2001), 
Easterly and Levine (2014, p. 5) concludes that their measure reflects some 
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“countervailing forces, such as the transmission and dissemination of human capital 
skills and technology” that “overcame any adverse effects from small European 
settlements”. The mechanism transmitted by this measure is therefore different from 
what the settler mortality measure accounts for. Empirically they show that there is no 
independent effect running from settler mortality to Euroshare (ibid., p.15). Another 
relevant result of Easterly and Levine (2014) is that their Euroshare measure does not 
significantly affect development when it is included together with either education or 
with government quality as a dependent variable. This suggests that both settler 
mortality and Euroshare may exert their effects on development through institutions, 
but that they represent two different mechanisms.  
 
Table 4. Variables of colonial heritage and the two dimensions of property rights 
 Dependent variable: 
 definition dimension assignment dimension 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
constant 
-0.635 
(0.442) 
-0.561 
(0.559) 
0.855 
(0.560) 
0.788 
(0.625) 
log settler mortality 
0.021 
(0.081) 
0.049 
(0.113) 
-0.272 
(-2.92)*** 
-0.241 
(0.125)* 
Euroshare  
2.200 
(0.553)*** 
 
0.666 
(0.601) 
English lang. frac. 
0.615 
(0.336)* 
 
0.133 
(0.326) 
 
European lang. frac 
0.843 
(0.249)*** 
 
0.311 
(0.336) 
 
R2 0.308 0.316 0.231 0.198 
adj. R2 0.278 0.285 0.197 0.161 
number of obs. 73 46 73 46 
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are in parentheses. Letters in the upper index refer to significance: *** : significance 
at 1 %, ** : significance at 5%. Standard errors without an index mean that the coefficient is not significant even at the 10 
% level.  
The dependent variables are the two dimensions of property rights derived from the factor analysis detailed in section 3.1. Log 
settler mortality is the log mortality rates of soldiers, bishops, and sailors stationed in the colonies between the seventeenth and 
nineteenth centuries from Acemoglu et al. (2001). Euroshare is the European share of the population during colonization 
from Easterly and Levine (2014). English lang. frac. and European lang. frac are the fraction of the population speaking 
English and the fraction of the population speaking one of the major languages of Western Europe: English, French, 
German, Portuguese, or Spanish.  
 
The results of the regressions that are run with these insights in mind are shown 
in Table 4. The two dependent variables are the same as before, the independent ones 
are those which I have just described. Since the language fraction variables and the 
Euroshare variable are alternative measures of the same, I do not include them together. 
The prediction does not seem to be rejected again. European and English language and 
the Euroshare variables are only significant at the usual level when it is the definition 
dimension that is to be “explained”. Log settler mortality has no significant effect in this 
case. When, however, it is the assignment dimension which the regressions are run on, 
the exact opposite is true: log settler mortality matters at the usual statistically significant 
level, while the European influence variables do not. 
To sum up the regression results, as we have seen and as is usually the case with 
regression results they are not crystal clear. The predictions are not rejected, however, 
since a balanced evaluation of the cross-country regressions above is that the variables 
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of economic development have a larger and a statistically more significant effect on the 
assignment dimension than on the definitions dimension. The regressions results even 
add something to the theoretical prediction because they show that although cultural 
variables are more important for the definition dimension in general, it is especially true 
for the “deeper” cultural variables – those that measure religious adherence and 
European influence in the very long run. 
5. Conclusions 
This paper has tried to take the “economic approach” to property rights seriously 
as a guide to understanding cross-country variation of property rights security. Taking 
such a close look at the implications of this approach reveals that to simply see it as the 
prediction that higher GDP leads to better property rights security is mistaken for three 
reasons. First, because property rights quality is a two-dimensional concept: the 
definition of property rights and the assignment of property rights are two separate 
constitutional decisions. Second, the effect of economic development may be different 
on these two dimensions of property rights. Third, as a determinant of transaction costs, 
culture should be considered; culture does not exist outside the box of the economic 
approach to property rights. 
Trying to apply these insights consistently has led to the conclusion that the 
definition dimension is affected by development less strongly and by culture more 
strongly than the assignment dimension is. Results of the cross-country regressions have 
not rejected these predictions, but they also have shown that the effect of culture may 
be even more complicated than the theoretical argument implies. Deeper layers of 
culture seem to have a greater effect on the dimension of property rights and a lesser 
effect on the assignment of rights.  
All in all, following the economic approach in order to understand cross country 
variance of property rights security is fruitful. It might help us understand the different 
causal mechanisms through which a higher level of economic development leads to 
more secure property rights, and can help us see how different layers of culture may 
affect them through changing the transaction costs of the assignment and definition of 
property rights.  
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Appendix 1. Statistics from the factor analysis used in section 4.1.  
 
Table 5. Descriptive Statistics of freedom components 
 
Civil Liberties sub-component/ 
Economic Freedom areas 
Mean Std. Dev. 
No. of 
countries 
Freedom of Expression and Belief 12.16 3.78 122 
Associational and Organizational Rights 8.58 3.43 122 
Rule of Law 9.03 4.54 122 
civil rights 
subcategories 
Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights 10.28 3.77 122 
Size of Government 6.34 1.38 122 
Legal Structure and Property Rights 5.90 1.93 122 
Sound Money 8.14 1.51 122 
Freedom to trade internationally 6.97 1.36 122 
economic freedom 
areas 
Regulation 6.77 0.95 122 
 
Table 6. Communalities 
 
Civil Liberties sub-component/ 
Economic Freedom areas 
Initial Extraction 
Freedom of Expression and Belief 0.890 0.805 
Associational and Organizational Rights 0.896 0.887 
Rule of Law 0.921 0.944 
civil rights subcategories 
Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights 0.877 0.891 
Size of Government 0.203 0.086 
Legal Structure and Property Rights 0.701 0.544 
Sound Money 0.572 0.564 
Freedom to trade internationally 0.610 0.770 
economic freedom areas 
Regulation 0.435 0.436 
Table 7. Total Variance Explained 
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Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings 
Factor 
Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative % Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative % Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative % 
1 5.277 58.637 58.637 5.045 56.051 56.051 3.327 36.968 36.968 
2 1.239 13.770 72.407 0.882 9.803 65.854 2.600 28.887 65.854 
3 0.956 10.620 83.027       
4 0.583 6.475 89.503       
5 0.415 4.606 94.109       
6 0.275 3.050 97.159       
7 0.135 1.501 98.660       
8 0.066 0.730 99.390       
9 0.055 0.610 100.000       
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. 
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Appendix 2. Regression results of the basic specification 
Table 8. Cross-country regressions: basic specifications with religious adherence variables 
 Dependent variable: 
 definition dimension assignment dimension 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
constant 
-0.830 
(0.357)*** 
-1.563 
(0.847)* 
-1.120 
(0.425)*** 
0.206 
(0.406) 
-3.172 
(0.950)*** 
-0.344 
(0.395) 
log of GDP p.c.  
0.105 
(0.114) 
  
0.458 
(0.135)*** 
 
log of average 
years of primary 
schooling 
  
0.222 
(0.148) 
  
0.473 
(0.108)*** 
Catholic 
0.800 
(0.302)** 
0.739 
(0.302)** 
0.743 
(0.291)** 
0.136 
(0.265) 
-0.220 
(0.287) 
0.063 
(0.258) 
Protestant 
0.642 
(0.431) 
0.336 
(0.464) 
0.688 
(0.443)** 
0.095 
(0.608) 
-0.631 
(0.579) 
-0.009 
(0.535) 
Muslim 
-0.459 
(0.356) 
-0.451 
(0.363) 
-0.177 
(0.408) 
-0.226 
(0.367) 
-0.233 
(0.313) 
0.098 
(0.325) 
Other religions 
1.121 
(0.560)** 
1.342 
(0.662)* 
1.598 
(0.658)** 
-1.053 
(0.487)** 
-0.283 
(0.446) 
-0.278 
(0.466) 
French legal or. 
-0.354 
(0.196)* 
-0.353 
(0.187)* 
-0.223 
(0.214) 
-0.391 
(0.217)* 
-0.212 
(0.200) 
-0.277 
(0.209) 
German legal or. 
-0.088 
(0.249) 
-0.153 
(0.276) 
-0.052 
(0.246) 
-0.173 
(0.208) 
-0.031 
(0.202) 
-0.277 
(0.209) 
Scandinavian legal 
origin 
-0.321 
(0.266) 
-0.262 
(0.286) 
-0.306 
(0.274) 
-0.225 
(0.522) 
0.070 
(0.536) 
-0.142 
(0.492) 
Socialist legal 
origin 
-0.646 
(0.203)*** 
 
-0.322 
(0.295) 
-3.899 
(-0.239)*** 
 
-3.312 
(0.231)*** 
latitude 
2.396 
(0.437)*** 
2.313 
(0.540)*** 
2.165 
(0.455)*** 
0.985 
(0.516)* 
0.005 
(0.772) 
0.575 
(0.498) 
ethnic 
fractionalization 
-0.173 
(0.316) 
-0.205 
(0.340) 
-0.133 
(0.327) 
-0.397 
(0.369) 
-0.464 
(0.366) 
-0.234 
(0.342) 
R2 0.511 0.518 0.506 0.382 0.416 0.452 
adj. R2 0.464 0.463 0.450 0.323 0.349 0.390 
number of obs. 115 99 110 115 99 110 
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are in parentheses. Letters in the upper index refer to significance: *** : significance 
at 1 %, ** : significance at 5%. Standard errors without an index mean that the coefficient is not significant even at the 10 
% level.  
The dependent variables are the two dimensions of property rights derived from the factor analysis detailed in section 3.1. Log 
GDP p. c. is the natural logarithm of CGDPe per capita in 1970 from Feenstra et al (2013), log of average years of 
primary schooling are from Barro and Lee (2013) and measure the average primary school years of those above the age of 15 
for the year 1970. Catholic, Protestant, Muslim, and Other Religions reflect adherence fractions of the population and are 
from Barro (2003). Legal origins are dummy variables with the value of one if the country’s legal system has the origin 
indicated, English legal origin is the omitted one, and the data are from LaPorta et al. (2008). Latitude is the latitude of 
the country centroid from Gallup et al. (2001) in absolute value and divided by 90. Data on ethnic fractionalization are 
from Alesina et al. (2003) 
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Table 9. Cross-country regressions: basic specifications with Hofstede’s cultural dimensions 
 Dependent variable: 
 definition dimension assignment dimension 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
constant 
-0.854 
(0.617) 
-2.037 
(1.250)* 
-1.206 
(0.625)* 
1.518 
(0.706) 
-1.824 
(1.979) 
0.874 
(0.605) 
log of GDP p.c.  
0.154 
(0.153) 
  
0.469 
(0.217)** 
 
log of average years of 
primary schooling 
  
0.363 
(0.171)** 
  
0.664 
(0.132)*** 
power distance 
-0.009 
(0.005)* 
-0.007 
(0.005) 
-0.009 
(0.005)* 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
0.003 
(0.005) 
-0.003 
(0.004) 
individualism 
0.016 
(0.006)*** 
0.011 
(0.007)* 
0.013 
(0.006)** 
0.012 
(0.007) 
0.006 
(0.008) 
0.007 
(0.005) 
masculinity 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.005 
(0.004) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.009 
(0.006) 
-0.022 
(0.009)** 
-0.010 
(0.005)* 
uncertainty avoidance 
0.019 
(0.006)*** 
0.019 
(0.006)*** 
0.018 
(0.005)*** 
-0.007 
(0.005) 
-0.009 
(0.005)* 
-0.009 
(0.005)* 
French legal or. 
-0.158 
(-0.259) 
-0.187 
(-0.283) 
-0.124 
(0.266) 
-0.110 
(0.294) 
-0.211 
(0.239) 
-0.047 
(0.213) 
German legal or. 
0.239 
(0.273) 
0.044 
(0.282) 
0.141 
(0.284) 
0.130 
(0.285) 
0.381 
(0.281) 
-0.049 
(0.176) 
Scandinavian legal origin 
0.471 
(0.329) 
0.180 
(0.323) 
0.358 
(0.329) 
-0.390 
(0.439) 
-1.064 
(0.538)* 
-0.598 
(0.422) 
Socialist legal origin       
latitude 
-0.186 
(0.907) 
-0.208 
(0.706) 
-0.151 
(0.877) 
-0.659 
(0.756) 
-0.703 
(0.768) 
0.596 
(0.544) 
ethnic fractionalization 
-0.207 
(0.405) 
-0.256 
(0.468) 
-0.107 
(0.407) 
-0.825 
(0.502) 
-0.766 
(0.443)* 
-0.642 
(0.372)* 
R2 0.591 0.660 0.630 0.325 0.491 0.477 
adj. R2 0.524 0.586 0.561 0.215 0.380 0.381 
number of obs. 65 57 65 65 57 65 
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are in parentheses. Letters in the upper index refer to significance: *** : significance 
at 1 %, ** : significance at 5%. Standard errors without an index mean that the coefficient is not significant even at the 10 
% level.  
The dependent variables are the two dimensions of property rights derived from the factor analysis detailed in section 3.1. Log 
GDP p. c. is the natural logarithm of CGDPe per capita in 1970 from Feenstra et al (2013), log of average years of 
primary schooling are from Barro and Lee (2013) and measure the average primary school years of those above the age of 15 
for the year 1970. Power distance, individualism, masculinity, and uncertainty avoidance are cultural dimensions developed 
in Hofstede et al. (2010), while the data are from Hofstede et al. (2012). 
Legal origins are dummy variables with the value of one if the country’s legal system has the origin indicated, English legal 
origin is the omitted one, and the data are from LaPorta et al. (2008). Latitude is the latitude of the country centroid from 
Gallup et al. (2001) in absolute value and divided by 90. Data on ethnic fractionalization are from Alesina et al. (2003) 
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Table 10. Cross-country regressions: basic specifications with Schwartz’s cultural dimensions 
 Dependent variable: 
 definition dimension assignment dimension 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
constant 
-0.038 
(0.667) 
-1.021 
(1.755) 
-0.040 
(0.670) 
1.216 
(0.678)* 
-2.262 
(2.465) 
0.440 
(0.635) 
log of GDP p.c.  
0.051 
(0.193) 
  
0.378 
(0.274) 
 
log of average 
years of 
primary 
schooling 
  
0.001 
(0.130) 
  
0.535 
(0.123)*** 
autonomy-
embeddedness 
0.025 
(0.112) 
-0.114 
(0.149) 
0.025 
(0.113) 
0.146 
(0.112) 
-0.002 
(0.179) 
0.162 
(0.105) 
egalitarianism-
hierarchy 
0.567 
(0.191)** 
0.435 
(0.198)** 
0.566 
(0.191)*** 
-0.032 
(0.196) 
-0.232 
(0.196) 
-0.154 
(0.198) 
mastery-
harmony 
-0.020 
(0.183) 
-0.050 
(0.206) 
-0.020 
(0.186) 
-0.347 
(0.213) 
-0.391 
(0.282) 
-0.339 
(0.217) 
French legal or. 
-0.170 
(0.354) 
0.020 
(0.365) 
-0.170 
(0.358) 
-1.053 
(0.441)** 
-0.867 
(0.553) 
-0.966 
(0.426)** 
German legal 
or. 
0.384 
(0.405) 
0.296 
(0.415) 
0.384 
(0.411) 
-0.630 
(0.445) 
-0.511 
(0.536) 
-0.794 
(0.425)* 
Scandinavian 
legal origin 
-0.100 
(0.350) 
-0.230 
(0.359) 
-0.100 
(0.355) 
-0.740 
(0.480) 
-0.709 
(0.655) 
-0.717 
(0.458) 
Socialist legal 
origin 
      
latitude 
0.516 
(1.038) 
1.815 
(0.931)* 
0.516 
(1.056) 
0.113 
(1.029) 
0.351 
(1.358) 
-0.011 
(0.990) 
ethnic 
fractionalization 
0.526 
(0.549) 
0.672 
(0.608) 
0.528 
(0.551) 
-1.133 
(0.608)* 
-0.966 
(0.630) 
-0.808 
(0.559) 
R2 0.557 0.585 0.557 0.343 0.414 0.404 
adj. R2 0.469 0.475 0.455 0.211 0.258 0.267 
number of obs. 49 44 49 49 44 49 
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are in parentheses. Letters in the upper index refer to significance: *** : significance 
at 1 %, ** : significance at 5%. Standard errors without an index mean that the coefficient is not significant even at the 10 
% level.  
The dependent variables are the two dimensions of property rights derived from the factor analysis detailed in section 3.1. Log 
GDP p. c. is the natural logarithm of CGDPe per capita in 1970 from Feenstra et al (2013), log of average years of 
primary schooling are from Barro and Lee (2013) and measure the average primary school years of those above the age of 15 
for the year 1970. Cultural variables come from principal component analysis of each of the two components Schwartz 
(2008:8-10) identifies as “bipolar dimensions” of culture. That is, based on the Licht et al. (2007) data autonomy-
embeddedness is the first principal component of intellectual autonomy, affective autonomy and the negative of embeddedness; 
egalitarianism-hierarchy is the first principal component of egalitarianism and the negative of hierarchy; mastery-harmony is 
the first principal component of mastery and the negative of harmony. Legal origins are dummy variables with the value of 
one if the country’s legal system has the origin indicated, English legal origin is the omitted one, and the data are from 
LaPorta et al. (2008). Latitude is the latitude of the country centroid from Gallup et al. (2001) in absolute value and 
divided by 90. Data on ethnic fractionalization are from Alesina et al. (2003) 
Appendix 3. Regression results of the first robustness tests 
Table 11. Cross-country regressions: robustness test with religious adherence variables 
 Dependent variable: 
 definition dimension assignment dimension 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
constant 
-0.877 
(0.302)*** 
-1.591 
(1.018) 
-1.169 
(-3.38)*** 
0.344 
(0.477) 
-3.004 
(0.948)*** 
-1.072 
(0.519)** 
log of GDP p.c.  
0.109 
(0.126) 
  
0.406 
(0.142)*** 
 
log of average 
years of 
primary 
schooling 
  
0.244 
(0.136)* 
  
0.641 
(0.196)*** 
Catholic 
-0.141 
(0.281) 
-0.123 
(0.265) 
-0.110 
(0.261) 
0.094 
(0.407) 
-0.192 
(0.266) 
0.114 
(0.364) 
Protestant 
0.068 
(0.335) 
-0.038 
(0.322) 
0.079 
(0.323) 
0.248 
(0.426) 
-0.299 
(0.335) 
0.226 
(0.384) 
Muslim 
-0.908 
(0.337)*** 
-0.868 
(0.369)** 
-0.539 
(0.396) 
-0.159 
(0.441) 
-0.305 
(0.293) 
0.398 
(0.494) 
Other religions 
0.971 
(0.567)* 
1.054 
(0.656) 
1.545 
(0.639)** 
-0.736 
(0.628) 
-0.440 
(0.471) 
0.286 
(0.707) 
English lang. 
frac. 
-0.273 
(0.218) 
-0.299 
(0.208) 
-0.406 
(0.213)* 
0.577 
(0.259)** 
0.356 
(0.307) 
0.216 
(0.291) 
European lang. 
frac 
0.665 
(0.169)*** 
0.566 
(0.169)*** 
0.677 
(0.151)*** 
0.107 
(0.45) 
-0.143 
(0.264) 
0.117 
(0.256) 
latitude 
2.697 
(0.362)** 
2.337 
(0.519)* 
2.466 
(0.386)*** 
1.352 
(2.29)** 
0.312 
(0.783) 
0.767 
(0.618) 
ethnic 
fractionalization 
0.042 
(0.286) 
-0.029 
(0.29) 
0.122 
(0.295) 
-0.222 
(0.347) 
-0.342 
(0.333) 
0.082 
(0.328) 
R2 0.524 0.526 0.534 0.264 0.408 0.385 
adj. R2 0.485 0.476 0.485 0.200 0.344 0.321 
number of obs. 102 94 97 102 94 97 
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are in parentheses. Letters in the upper index refer to significance: *** : significance 
at 1 %, ** : significance at 5%. Standard errors without an index mean that the coefficient is not significant even at the 10 
% level.  
The dependent variables are the two dimensions of property rights derived from the factor analysis detailed in section 3.1. Log 
GDP p. c. is the natural logarithm of CGDPe per capita in 1970 from Feenstra et al (2013), log of average years of 
primary schooling are from Barro and Lee (2013) and measure the average primary school years of those above the age of 15 
for the year 1970. Catholic, Protestant, Muslim, and Other Religions reflect adherence fractions of the population and are 
from Barro (2003). English lang. frac. and European lang. frac are the fraction of the population speaking English and the 
fraction of the population speaking one of the major languages of Western Europe: English, French, German, Portuguese, or 
Spanish. Latitude is the latitude of the country centroid from Gallup et al. (2001) in absolute value and divided by 90. 
Data on ethnic fractionalization are from Fearon (2003).  
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Table 12. Cross-country regressions: robustness test with Hofstede’s cultural dimensions 
 Dependent variable: 
 definition dimension assignment dimension 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
constant 
-0.735 
(0.338)** 
-1.719 
(1.255) 
 
1.044 
(0.699) 
-1.308 
(2.112) 
0.278 
(0.581) 
log of GDP p.c.  
0.126 
(0.149) 
  
0.293 
(0.266) 
 
log of average 
years of 
primary 
schooling 
  
0.340 
(0.164) 
  
0.619 
(0.134)*** 
power distance 
-0.007 
(0.003)* 
-0.006 
(0.004) 
-0.006 
(0.004) 
-0.003 
(0.004) 
-0.000 
(0.005) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
individualism 
0.008 
(0.005) 
0.005 
(0.006) 
0.006 
(0.005) 
0.013 
(0.006) 
0.008 
(0.008) 
0.010 
(0.004)** 
masculinity 
-0.005 
(0.003) 
-0.005 
(0.003) 
-0.005 
(0.004) 
-0.012 
(0.005)** 
-0.011 
(0.006)* 
-0.011 
(0.005)** 
uncertainty 
avoidance 
0.013 
(0.004)*** 
0.012 
(0.004)*** 
0.012 
(0.007)*** 
-0.003 
(-0.006) 
-0.004 
(0.006) 
-0.004 
(0.006) 
English lang. 
frac. 
0.157 
(0.244) 
0.166 
(0.236) 
0.011 
(0.222) 
0.275 
(0.366) 
0.295 
(0.367) 
0.009 
(0.403) 
European lang. 
frac 
0.349 
(0.175)* 
0.298 
(0.181) 
0.344 
(0.161)** 
0.053 
(0.262) 
-0.096 
(0.241) 
0.044 
(0.244) 
latitude 
1.212 
(0.622)* 
1.123 
(0.604)* 
1.141 
(0.624)* 
-0.486 
(0.730) 
-0.607 
(0.744) 
-0.615 
(0.597) 
ethnic 
fractionalization 
-0.335 
(0.445) 
-0.353 
(0.454) 
-0.138 
(0.409) 
-0.543 
(0.440) 
-0.550 
(0.398) 
-0.183 
(0.308) 
R2 0.667 0.676 0.706 0.345 0.390 0.480 
adj. R2 0.610 0.611 0.648 0.233 0.268 0.378 
number of obs. 56 55 56 56 55 56 
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are in parentheses. Letters in the upper index refer to significance: *** : significance 
at 1 %, ** : significance at 5%. Standard errors without an index mean that the coefficient is not significant even at the 10 
% level.  
The dependent variables are the two dimensions of property rights derived from the factor analysis detailed in section 3.1. Log 
GDP p. c. is the natural logarithm of CGDPe per capita in 1970 from Feenstra et al (2013), log of average years of 
primary schooling are from Barro and Lee (2013) and measure the average primary school years of those above the age of 15 
for the year 1970. Power distance, individualism, masculinity, and uncertainty avoidance are cultural dimensions developed 
in Hofstede et al. (2010), while the data are from Hofstede et al. (2012). 
 English lang. frac. and European lang. frac are the fraction of the population speaking English and the fraction of the 
population speaking one of the major languages of Western Europe: English, French, German, Portuguese, or Spanish. 
Latitude is the latitude of the country centroid from Gallup et al. (2001) in absolute value and divided by 90. Data on 
ethnic fractionalization are from Fearon (2003).  
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Table 13. Cross-country regressions: robustness test with Schwartz’s dimensions of culture 
 Dependent variable: 
 definition dimension assignment dimension 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
constant 
-0.706 
(0.470) 
-2.189 
(1.449) 
-1.102 
(-2.17)** 
0.486 
(0.728) 
-2.182 
(2.074) 
-0.031 
(0.778) 
log of GDP p.c.  
0.170 
(0.182) 
  
0.297 
(0.264) 
 
log of average 
years of primary 
schooling 
  
0.239 
(0.105) 
  
0.312 
(0.157)* 
autonomy-
embeddedness 
-0.110 
(0.108) 
-0.181 
(0.126) 
-0.136 
(0.107) 
0.263 
(0.151)* 
0.128 
(0.180) 
0.228 
(0.148) 
egalitarianism-
hierarchy 
0.313 
(0.154)** 
0.272 
(0.163) 
0.287 
(0.155)* 
-0.015 
(0.157) 
-0.145 
(0.168) 
-0.049 
(0.154) 
mastery-harmony 
-0.051 
(0.138) 
-0.008 
(0.140) 
-0.023 
(0.141) 
-0.368 
(0.198)* 
-0.377 
(0.224) 
-0.332 
(0.204) 
English lang. frac. 
-0.116 
(0.361) 
-0.317 
(0.339) 
-0.313 
(0.414) 
1.751 
(0.522)*** 
1.465 
(0.610) 
1.493 
(0.582)** 
European lang. 
frac 
0.242 
(0.247) 
0.286 
(0.251) 
0.323 
(0.262) 
-0.757 
(0.432)* 
-0.727 
(-0.445) 
-0.650 
(0.452) 
latitude 
2.161 
(0.916)** 
2.183 
(0.902)** 
2.191 
(0.922)** 
-0.135 
(1.348) 
0.105 
(1.257) 
-0.096 
(1.334) 
ethnic 
fractionalization 
0.622 
(0.502) 
0.638 
(0.484) 
0.778 
(0.501) 
-0.140 
(0.521) 
-0.006 
(0.549) 
0.064 
(0.552) 
R2 0.606 0.617 0.622 0.414 0.442 0.434 
adj. R2 0.529 0.526 0.536 0.300 0.311 0.305 
number of obs. 44 43 44 44 44 44 
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are in parentheses. Letters in the upper index refer to significance: *** : significance 
at 1 %, ** : significance at 5%. Standard errors without an index mean that the coefficient is not significant even at the 10 
% level.  
The dependent variables are the two dimensions of property rights derived from the factor analysis detailed in section 3.1. Log 
GDP p. c. is the natural logarithm of CGDPe per capita in 1970 from Feenstra et al (2013), log of average years of 
primary schooling are from Barro and Lee (2013) and measure the average primary school years of those above the age of 15 
for the year 1970. Cultural variables come from principal component analysis of each of the two components Schwartz 
(2008, pp. 8-10) identifies as “bipolar dimensions” of culture. That is, based on the Licht et al. (2007) data autonomy-
embeddedness is the first principal component of intellectual autonomy, affective autonomy and the negative of embeddedness; 
egalitarianism-hierarchy is the first principal component of egalitarianism and the negative of hierarchy; mastery-harmony is 
the first principal component of mastery and the negative of harmony. English lang. frac. and European lang. frac are the 
fraction of the population speaking English and the fraction of the population speaking one of the major languages of 
Western Europe: English, French, German, Portuguese, or Spanish. Latitude is the latitude of the country centroid from 
Gallup et al. (2001) in absolute value and divided by 90. Data on ethnic fractionalization are from Fearon (2003).  
 
 
 
